REBECCA B. CONNELY, Bankruptcy Judge.
The question this Court must answer is whether to confirm the debtor's chapter 12 plan, and if not, whether to deny leave to amend and dismiss the debtor's case pursuant to section 1208(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The debtor filed a chapter 12 plan and three amended chapter 12 plans. None of the plans has been confirmed. The two largest creditors and the chapter 12 trustee objected to each plan. The debtor's two largest secured creditors object to their treatment under the current plan and advocate for dismissal, citing unreasonable delay that is prejudicial to the creditors, under 11 U.S.C. § 1208(c)(1), and the continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation, under 11 U.S.C. § 1208(c)(9). The farm seeks confirmation of its fourth chapter 12 plan over the objections of its creditors, or in the alternative leave to amend in order to file a fifth plan in hopes that it might be confirmed. One of the creditors has urged this Court to deny any further leave to amend and simply dismiss the case.
As more fully set forth below, the Court denies confirmation of the plan. Furthermore, the Court denies the debtor leave to amend the plan. Therefore, and for other cause shown, the Court dismisses the case.
Keith's Tree Farms is purported to be a general partnership organized under Virginia law, owned and run by the Keith Family.
On August 14, 2013, Mr. Keith filed a voluntary petition under chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code on behalf of Keith's Tree Farms.
Keith's Tree Farms filed the first chapter 12 plan for reorganization on November
After multiple continuances, the Court held the hearing on confirmation of the first chapter 12 plan on March 13, 2014, at which time the Court denied confirmation and directed the debtor to file an amended plan by March 27.
The debtor amended the plan and schedules. This new plan altered the treatment of the claims of Grayson National Bank and First Community Bank. Specifically, the new plan proposed to transfer property known as the Patterson Rock Quarry along with the trees on the property to Grayson National Bank for a total credit of $615,000.
Eight days before the hearing set for confirmation, Keith's Tree Farms filed what it called an "Amended Amended Chapter 12 Plan" ("Second Amended Plan").
Yet again, Grayson National Bank and First Community Bank objected to their treatment under the Second and Third Amended Plans, citing the debtor's alleged lack of good faith in violation of section 1225(a)(3), the plan's failure to pay present value of all secured claims in violation of section 1225(a)(5), and the plan's lack of feasibility under section 1225(a)(6).
Along with its objection to confirmation, First Community Bank filed a motion to dismiss the case.
At the hearing on June 5, the Court heard from three witnesses regarding confirmation and the motion to dismiss—Mr. Keith, as general partner of Keith's Tree Farms; Mrs. Keith, as bookkeeper; and Mr. Tom Gentry, as the account executive for Grayson National Bank on the Keith's Tree Farms account. The Court first heard from Mr. Keith.
Mr. Keith testified that he and his sons operated Keith's Tree Farms as a general partnership since 1991; however, they had since misplaced the partnership agreement and Mr. Keith had decided to stop accepting a salary from the partnership.
Mr. Keith explained that the partnership had made more money last spring than in the previous years and he expected this trend to continue into the future.
On cross examination, Mr. Keith acknowledged Keith's Tree Farms owed Grayson National Bank $8,881.77 for its unauthorized use of cash collateral and currently it did not have the funds to cure this debt.
Turning to the Third Amended Plan, Mr. Keith testified that he believed it was
Counsel for Grayson National Bank then confronted Mr. Keith with the debtor's income and expense projections, which Mr. Keith had attached to the Third Amended Plan.
Next, counsel for First Community Bank questioned Mr. Keith about its collateral. Counsel probed into the debtor's current valuation of the rental property pledged to First Community Bank as collateral. Mr. Keith admitted that he is not a real estate appraiser and his valuation was merely an estimate, but he testified that after he toured the property, he realized it was not in the condition he originally thought it was.
After Mr. Keith's examination ended, the debtor called Mrs. Keith to testify as bookkeeper of Keith's Tree Farms. According to her testimony and Exhibit 5, the partnership had revenue of $106,000 for the month of May.
Mrs. Keith also prepared the income and expense projections for the coming year.
The document suggested the debtor could make its payments and be profitable; however, as the secured creditors later pointed
On cross examination, the secured creditors attacked the validity and trustworthiness of Exhibit 6, as well as Mrs. Keith's reliability and acumen as a bookkeeper. On cross, Mrs. Keith admitted that the numbers she had used in Exhibit 6 were wrong, because she only included one week's worth of salaries
After Mrs. Keith's testimony, Grayson National Bank called its witness—Mr. Tom Gentry. Mr. Gentry testified that he has worked as a bank executive in the Twin County area with Grayson National Bank and he has been involved with the Keith's Tree Farms credit facility.
Mr. Gentry also ran various amortizations over thirty years at differing interest rates, compounded daily, using the same software and methodology Grayson National Bank uses.
Finally, Mr. Gentry testified that in his experience in the banking industry, a thirty-year amortization for this type of agro-commercial loan is not practicable.
On cross examination, counsel for Keith's Tree Farms questioned Mr. Gentry about whether he credited the $52,500 payment Keith's Tree Farms had already made under the plan to the outstanding balance owed to Grayson National Bank in his amortization calculations.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement. The debtor and the secured creditors submitted briefs in support of their respective positions.
Bankruptcy Code section 1225 delineates the criteria a plan must meet for a court to confirm it. Subsection 1225(a) reads, in part:
11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3)-(6). Furthermore, if any creditor calls into question any element required for confirmation, it is the debtor's burden to prove compliance therewith. In re Brown, 244 B.R. 603, 607
Grayson National Bank and First Community Bank assert that the Court cannot confirm the plan, because it proposes an unreasonably low interest rate; is not proposed in good faith; is infeasible; proposes to amortize the payments over a period that is not commercially reasonable or permitted by the Code; and unfairly discriminates among creditors.
Section 1225(a)(6) of the Code requires the proposed chapter 12 plan to be one under which "the debtor will be able to make all payments"—i.e., the plan must be feasible. The Fourth Circuit has not defined a test for feasibility; however, courts within the Fourth Circuit consider whether the debtor will be able to comply with the terms of the plan based on the debtor's historical performance and current condition of the debtor's business. See Farmers Home Admin. v. Rape (In re Rape), 104 B.R. 741, 748-49 (W.D.N.C.1989). "Sincerity, honesty, and willingness are not sufficient to make the plan feasible, and neither are any visionary promises. The test is whether the things which are to be done after confirmation can be done as a practical matter under the facts." Id. at 749 (quoting Clarkson v. Cooke Sales & Serv. Co. (In re Clarkson), 767 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1985)).
Such a determination is difficult, as "[f]easibility is never certain, particularly in farm situations." Id. at 748 (quoting In re Kloberdanz, 83 B.R. 767, 773 (Bankr. D.Colo.1988)). Nevertheless, the ultimate burden of establishing feasibility, as with all elements of confirmation, rests on the debtor. Tofsrud, 230 B.R. at 872. Accordingly, the debtor must persuade the court that "it is probable, not merely possible or hopeful, that the Debtors can actually pay the restructured debt and perform all obligations of the plan." Rape, 104 B.R. at 749 (quoting Clarkson, 767 F.2d at 420). In considering the evidence, "the court should give the Chapter 12 debtor the benefit of the doubt regarding the issue of feasibility when the debtor's plan projections use reasonable data in light of the current economic climate." In re Hughes, No. 06-80219, 2006 WL 2620438, at *3 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. Sept. 11, 2006).
The debtor argues that its evidence is sufficient proof of feasibility. The debtor's evidence consists of the testimony of Mr. Keith as to the state of the farming operation; the testimony of Mrs. Keith regarding the cash flow projections; and the debtor's payment history supporting payments to chapter 12 trustee, which were made prior to confirmation.
Similarly, First Community Bank argues that the evidence presented at trial is inadequate to support a showing of feasibility, citing the errors with Mrs. Keith's cash flow and expense projections.
After considering the evidence and argument, the Court concludes that Keith's Tree Farms has not carried its burden in proving feasibility. A debtor must at least support its assertion of feasibility with "reasonable data" and projections. See Hughes, 2006 WL 2620438, at *3. Here, the only evidence of feasibility is Exhibit 6 and Mr. Keith's testimony. As explained above, Exhibit 6 contained several mistakes, rendering it insufficient to permit the Court to conclude that the financial projections contained within the Exhibit are more likely true than not. At the hearing, Mrs. Keith admitted she only included one-week's worth of salaries for each month.
Similarly, the Court finds Mr. Keith's testimony about the value of the trees unpersuasive. Mr. Keith testified there was millions of dollars' worth of trees on the Patterson Rock Quarry alone.
Ultimately, Keith's Tree Farms has failed to carry its burden in proving the plan is feasible. The evidence of future income and expense predictions has material defects that deprive it of credibility, and the testimony regarding the value of assets seems to be unreasonably optimistic.
Under section 1225(a)(5), a court may not confirm a chapter 12 plan without each secured creditor: (1) accepting the plan; (2)(a) retaining its lien and (b) receiving the full value of the allowed claim as of the date of petition; or (3) receiving the property securing its allowed claim via surrender. See 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5). Thus, when a debtor proposes to retain property pledged to a creditor as collateral, but the creditor does not accept its treatment under the plan, the plan must allow the creditor to retain its lien on the collateral and pay the creditor's allowed secured claim in full. See id. at 1225(a)(5)(B)(i)-(ii).
In this case, Grayson National Bank objected to the proposed credit the debtor sought under the plan for the surrender of the Patterson Rock Quarry and asserted that plan failed to provide adequate disbursements to pay the bank's entire secured claim in full.
Similarly, regarding Grayson National Bank's claim, Mr. Gentry testified, after running various amortizations over a thirty-year period and after crediting $615,000 to the outstanding debt, the debtor would have to make yearly payments of $65,737.92 to fully satisfy the debt.
Keith's Tree Farms bears the burden of proving the plan provides payments to satisfy the value of the allowed secured claims. With only the testimony of one witness, who openly admitted to basing his valuation solely on his opinion and then wavering on his valuation, coupled with the lack of evidence in support of the debtor's own amortizations or in opposition to the creditor's evidence disputing the debtor's figures, the Court concludes the Keith's Tree Farms has failed to carry its burden to prove the value of the secured claim or that the proposed payments will satisfy the allowed secured claim.
Even if the debtor's valuation is sufficient, however, this plan may not comply with section 1225(a)(5)(B). Both creditors also objected to the commercial reasonableness of the Third Amended Plan, based on the duration of the proposed plan. Included within the requirement of section 1225(a)(5)(B) that secured creditors be paid their allowed claims in full is the requirement that the repayment term be "commercially reasonable." See, e.g., In re Standley, No. 11-62373-12, 2013 WL 1191261, at *5 (Bankr.D.Mont. Mar. 22, 2013) (considering period of future payment stream as a risk factor in setting the reasonable interest rate); In re Torelli, 338 B.R. 390, 397 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.2006) ("[T]he Debtor's plan is not confirmable because the 20-year repayment period [in this case] does not conform to section 1225(a)(5). While the Code does not specifically limit the repayment period, the present value and feasibility provisions imply such limits."); In re Rose, 135 B.R. 603, 606 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1991) ("In determining the maximum acceptable length of time for extending a debtor's obligations to a secured creditor under a plan, courts have required debtors to support their proposals to lengthen the time for repaying obligations by presenting `evidence of reasonableness, customary lender practices, [and] market standards' in addition to showing that their proposal provides the secured creditors with the mathematical present value of their claims.") (quoting In re Koch, 131 B.R. 128, 132 (Bankr. N.D.Iowa 1991)).
Furthermore, Wells Fargo Financial Leasing Inc. v. Grigsby supports the proposition that the market is not the only
Conversely, both of the secured creditors' counsel cited Mr. Gentry's testimony as the only evidence of commercial reasonableness on the record.
The debtor suggests that the appropriate factors to consider are: the type of property, the debtor's circumstances, the length of the underlying note, and the general lenience to chapter 12 debtors. The only factor supporting the debtor's position that the term is reasonable is the general axiom of leniency. First, although some of the collateral securing the note is real estate, a sizeable portion of it is also personal property and the tree inventory on the real estate. Extending a loan term over thirty years on such property that depreciates rapidly, may be sold, and/or may become obsolete is unreasonable.
Conversely, the debtor has not offered any evidence to suggest this term is reasonable, does not prejudice creditors, or ensures all secured creditors are paid their allowed claims in full. Counsel for Keith's Tree Farms presented no witness, expert or lay, to testify to what would constitute a "reasonable" term for this type of loan in the current market and instead only sought to elicit from Mr. Gentry the fact that banks do offer certain mortgages with thirty-year amortizations. To this point, however, Mr. Gentry explained that banks offer such loans only in the consumer, residential context, rather than for agro-commercial loans.
The debtor simply has failed to carry its burden in proving the plan complies with the requirements for confirmation. The Court therefore sustains the objections to confirmation on the grounds that the plan is not feasible and does not provide to secured creditors payments to satisfy the present value of their allowed secured claims.
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies confirmation of the Third Amended Plan.
Section 1208(c)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the Court to dismiss the case if confirmation is denied and leave to amend is denied. See 11 U.S.C. § 1208(c)(5). Although no courts from within the Fourth Circuit have interpreted this provision, courts in other circuits have done so. In In re Luchenbill, the bankruptcy court decided that although reorganization was possible, cause existed to deny leave to amend, because the case had been pending for over a year; the debtor had proposed five un-confirmable plans; and the debtor had filed the plans in bad faith. 112 B.R. 204, 219 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1990). The court held that although the debtor had preserved the estate's assets adequately, the case should be dismissed. Id.
Here, Keith's Tree Farms filed its first plan in November 2013. Since then, Keith's Tree Farms has proposed three subsequent plans, none of which have been confirmable. A successful confirmation seems unlikely at this point, considering the consistent objections to confirmation, lack of evidence sufficient to overcome the objections, and the inability of the farm and its creditors to reach agreement on any aspect of the plan. If there is no reasonable likelihood of reorganization, requests for additional time should be denied. A debtor's request for
First Community Bank also moved the Court to dismiss this case.
Unreasonable delay is not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, but according to case law, unreasonable delays can result from failure to timely file documents, failure to file a confirmable plan, failure to file a modified plan, or failure to perform under a confirmed plan. In re French, 139 B.R. 476, 476 (Bankr.D.S.D. 1992). Similarly, gross mismanagement can be demonstrated by failure to provide accurate financial information and failure to provide insurance on collateral. In re Pertuset, 492 B.R. 232, 252 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 2012), aff'd, 485 B.R. 478 (6th Cir. BAP 2012).
As in Pertuset, the inconsistency of Keith's Tree Farms's financial information provided to the Court, along with the unreliable testimony at the June 5 hearing, raises serious concerns about the validity of the information submitted to the Court. The debtor has not provided an accurate picture of the debtor's obligations and the status of the farm's current operations. Furthermore, the Third Amended Plan is not significantly different from prior plans and the debtor does not appear to be in a position to achieve a confirmable plan in the near future. Keith Tree Farms's inability to file a confirmable plan contributes to the unreasonable delay. See French, 139 B.R. at 476. The inaccurate financial information and the debtor's inability to file a confirmable plan, amount to unreasonable delay that is prejudicial to creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1208(c)(1). Furthermore, the financial statements provided by the debtor do not show it can be successful based on its current and projected income. See In re Strickland, 12-07110-DD, 2013 WL 865542, at *5 (Bankr. D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2013) ("Therefore, the Court concludes that dismissal is appropriate because Debtor's business endeavors are not sufficiently profitable to allow Debtor to propose a feasible plan or complete a plan by making the necessary payments for the five-year period Debtor proposes."); accord, In re Weber, 297 B.R. 567, 572 (Bankr.N.D.Iowa 2003)(The court
These facts described above demonstrate cause to dismiss this case. Based on cause shown and this Court's denial of confirmation and denial of leave to amend the plan, this case shall be dismissed.
The Court
Furthermore, the Court declines to allow Keith's Tree Farms leave to amend its plan for a fourth time. The Court concludes that affording the farm with another opportunity to amend its plan is not in the best interest of the creditors and would be futile. As mentioned above, the Court finds that the debtor cannot afford to make the payments proposed in the current plan. The Court also determines that the term is not commercially reasonable at the proposed interest rate. Another plan with a shorter term or higher interest rate would require even higher payments, which the debtor would not be able to afford based on the evidence shown in this case. The Court concludes reorganization for Keith's Tree Farms is objectively futile. Accordingly, the Court denies confirmation of the Third Amended Plan and denies leave to amend.
The Court will contemporaneously issue an order consistent with the findings and ruling of this opinion.
The Court overrules the objection and admits Exhibit 9 into evidence. Although the values included in exhibit are inconsistent with the schedules, such contradictory statements are immaterial to the admissibility of the evidence and, instead, merely undercut the weight of the statements made in the document and in Court. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "[r]elevant evidence is admissible" unless proscribed by the Constitution, a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court." Fed.R.Evid. 402. See also Fed.R.Evid. 613(b) (admissible when witness available to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement) and Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (admissible for purposes of impeachment).